Christians for Hire: Mercenaries in Muslim Armies

Since the spread of Islam into the Iberian Peninsula, interfaith connections between Christians and Muslims—both hostile and cooperative—have developed. In the eleventh century, Taifa kingdoms emerged with the collapse of the caliphate, opening opportunities for Christian soldiers to fight in the service of Muslims against rival Taifa kingdoms, or for Muslim leaders to pay parias to Christian armies for protection. With the arrival of the fundamentalist Muslims from North Africa (first the Almoravids, then the Almohads in the Twelfth century), conflict shifted to religious based war. Still, Christians were hired as mercenaries in Muslim armies in wars not being fought against other Christians. With the collaboration of Christian forces in the battle of Las Navas in 1212, the Almohads in Iberia were defeated. At this time, most Christian mercenary soldiers fought in wars in North Africa against non-Christian enemies. A closer look at the high medieval period (from the eleventh to thirteenth century), reveals that many Christian soldiers played important roles in different Muslim armies, highlighting a connection between Christian and Muslim Spain and North Africa (the Maghrib).

The death of the first minister Abd al-Malik in 1008 caused a succession crisis in Al-Andalus which leads to the collapse of the caliphate and the creation of contending Taifa kingdoms. Simon Barton, who specializes in the interfaith relationships in medieval Spain, notes that, “the feuding Taifa successor-states that filled the political vacuum looked increasingly to the Christian states of northern Spain to provide them with the military muscle they needed in their regular territorial squabbles with their neighbours.”[1] Christian rulers exploited the situation, offering their Christian knights as protection to the Taifa kingdoms from their rivals in exchange for parias, an annual tribute. Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar, most commonly known as El Cid, is known to have fought for both Christian and Muslim rulers, either out of duty or for profit. El Cid first served Sancho II of Castile and assisted him in securing the Moorish kingdom of Zaragoza as a tributary of Castile. El Cid is most well-known for his accomplishments when he served Alfonso VI of Leon-Castile after Sancho’s death. In 1081, El Cid was exiled from Alfonso’s court, and took an army of soldiers that were loyal to him to find a profitable solution to his exile in Moorish Spain.[2] The Primera Cronica narrates El Cid’s activities around Zaragoza, painting the picture of a ruthless soldier who accumulates riches through warfare while building a reputation he used to instill fear: “My Cid remained a while in Alcocer, and the Moors of the border waited to see what he would do.”[3] El Cid offers to leave the Moors in Alcocer and go elsewhere for “three thousand marks of silver,” which was paid to him.[4] At first, El Cid’s mercenary forces were paid with spoils of war, then with tributes from Taifa kingdoms who were threatened of attack until a more permanent arrangement was established with Zaragoza. Jarbel Rodriguez, who translates and introduces the Primera Cronica, concludes that “the actions of El Cid are indicative of the fluid boundaries that separated Muslims from Christians in the Iberian Peninsula.”[5] During El Cid’s service to Zaragoza, the death of its king, al-Muqtadir, causes the dominion of  Zaragoza and Denia, to be divided between the king’s sons al-Mutamid and Abenalfange, who then go to war against each other.[6] El Cid remained in Zaragoza as a mercenary, serving al-Mutamid, who gave him great power and authority in Zaragoza for his protection. Abenalfange hires other Christian mercenaries to protect Denia, ultimately pitting Christian mercenaries against other mercenaries of the same faith. Rodriguez explains that “Religious difference was not an impediment to alliances or truces but an aspect of culture that could be negotiated and, at times, overshadowed by more pragmatic concerns.”[7]

There were various reasons for Christian soldiers to become mercenaries in the service of Muslim leaders. Some Christians, like El Cid, were forced to seek the position as a result of punishment from their king, having been exiled and needing to support themselves and their armies. Yet, not all Christian soldiers sought out mercenary opportunities with Muslims due to exile—many did so to increase their fortunes. This demonstrates that most commonly, Christians took the initiative to find mercenary positions with Muslims.[8] Barton gives the example of Fernando Rodríguez de Castro, who was lord of Trujillo and became at odds with his king, Fernando II of León, and decided to seek a more favourable position.[9] Fernando contacted the Almohad governor in Seville to inquire about a position and acquire non-hostile passage into Seville where he received “numerous gifts…to ally [with] the Muslim cause.”[10] The Almovids used Christian soldiers, who were prisoners of war, for militias in the Maghreb, but Christians chose to join these armies of their own free will, too.[11] Following the battle of Las Navas, the Almohad dominance in North Africa was threatened, creating a demand for talented soldiers to fill Muslim armies as mercenaries.[12] Barton notes that it was possible that “a year after Las Navas, with the royal coffers hugely depleted, and with famine and disease causing rural incomes to plummet, and forcing the king to curtail potentially lucrative military operations on the southern border, that some among the Castilian nobility were beginning to feel the financial pinch.”[13] It is evident that Christian soldiers and nobles found many opportunities to increase their power and wealth in Muslim al-Andalus and the Maghreb.

Christians soldiers were popular in Muslim armies for different reasons. In Moorish Spain, the Taifa kings had an insecure hold on the religious loyalty of their Muslim subjects and were vulnerable to invasion from Muslims in North Africa and rival Taifa kingdoms looking to expand their territories.[14] Muslim armies had different fighting styles than Christian armies, usually falling inferior to them when numbers were equal. Muslims in al-Andalus and North Africa preferred light cavalry, mounted archers with infantry that was geared towards surprise and ambush.[15] Ibn Khaldûn, an important scholar from the medieval Muslim world, outlines the military advantages of Christian fighting methods, including the importance of a closed formation techniques. Khaldûn explains that:

Fighting in closed formation is more steady and fierce than fighting with the technique of attack and withdrawal. This is because in fighting in closed formation, the lines are orderly and evenly arranged, like arrows or like rows of worshippers at prayers. People advanced in closed lines against the enemy. This makes for greater steadiness in assault and for better use of the proper tactics. It frightens the enemy more. A closed formation is like a long wall or a well-built castle which no one could hope to move…Therefore, the rulers of the Maghrib had to use soldiers from a nation used to hold firm in closed formation. That nation was the European Christians. The Maghribî rulers do that despite the fact that it means utilizing the aid of unbelievers. They fear that their own line formation might run away, and (they know that) the European Christians know only how to hold firm…[and are] more suitable for the purpose than others. However, the Maghribî rulers employ (such European Christians) only in wars against Arab and Berber nations, in order to force them into submission. They do not use them for the holy war, because they are afraid that they might take sides against the Muslims.[16]

Khaldûn’s explanation, written in the fourteenth century, provides valuable insights at the value Muslims placed on the fighting techniques of the Christian soldiers during the medieval period. The North African Muslims were not as tolerant of Christians as were the Muslims in the Taifa kingdoms, and it was notable that they made exceptions for them to serve in their armies based on their superior fighting skills.

By the thirteenth century, it became increasingly common for Muslim rulers to employ mercenary soldiers in North Africa, and though their conditions of service were unofficial in the early stages, over time they became more contractual.[17] Studies now indicate that Christian soldiers who served under the Almoravid Muslims were mostly slaves—prisoners of war from the Iberian campaign—while the Christians in the Almohad army were freeman.[18] When the Almohad defeated the Almoravids, taking over their capital, Marrakesh, they gave the Christian soldiers a choice to convert to Islam or return to Iberia. Many Christian mercenaries returned to Toledo at this time, but soon “the demands of ruling a trans-Mediterranean and multiethnic empire” forced the Almohad Muslims to welcome the Christians back.[19]  Barton explains that some “Christian mercenaries were recruited by the rulers of the Maghreb as a result of political agreements carried out at the highest level.”[20] Christian kings bartered their knights’ services for territory, including frontier castles, rights to build churches in Muslim cities, and to fill royal coffers while knights earned a monthly stipend.[21] Despite  these contracts, Christian mercenaries had an uncertain status “about the larger questions of propriety, belonging, and allegiance.”[22] As a result of the religion-based holy war in Iberia, Christian mercenaries were only utilized against rival Muslims, but some still questioned their loyalty since they were serving an enemy of their faith.

The Catholic church’s position regarding Christian mercenaries wavered, especially during the time when the Christian and Muslim conflict became religion-based. Following Las Navas, Pope Innocent III “instructed the clergy throughout Spain to excommunicate any Christians who helped the Saracens in war against other Christians.”[23] Following this directive, Archbishop Rodrigo Jimenez of Toledo composed a letter in which he urged Christian soldiers “to desist from this aim…and not to ally yourselves with that perverse people.”[24] At this time, many Christian soldiers were displaced when the pope declared the Iberian crusade over, and were seeking new opportunities for income with their Almohad enemies. Michael Lower, a historian specializing in religious differences in the medieval period, explains that “church teaching on mercenaries and military aid to Muslims evolved significantly, gaining flexibility and refinement in the process.”[25] This process encouraged the partnership with the Maghrib, where the church, instead of excommunicating mercenaries in the service of a rival faith, used it as an opportunity for missionary work. Lower explains that “the papacy’s support for the mercenaries was tied to its larger aim for North Africa: to re-Christianize what had been a heartland of the late antique church.”[26] Pope Honorius III sent a request to the Almohad caliph, “requesting that Christians living under his rule be allowed to practise their law.”[27] Eva Gutierrez, a historian specializing in Arabic and Islamic studies, notes the importance of these letters. This correspondence informs us of the church’s position regarding mercenaries; further, it “reveals the places of residence of the Christian militias in the mid-thirteenth century—Marrakesh, Tunnis, Béjaïa and Ceuta.”[28]  Clergy were sent to North Africa to minister to Christians away from home, ensuring they honoured their vows and most likely to prohibit their conversion to Islam.

Christian mercenaries played significant roles in Muslim armies both in the Taifa kingdoms on the Iberian Peninsula and in the Maghreb in North Africa, demonstrating interfaith connections despite often hostile religious conflict between Christians and Muslims. Historical figures such as El Cid provide a distinct picture of the role of a mercenary soldier in the high medieval period which is reflective of many other Christian knights during this time. Nobles often fell out of favour with their kings and had to seek other means to support themselves and sometimes their armies which demonstrates the necessarily transient loyalty of soldiers. Exiled soldiers were not the only Christians to seek opportunities as mercenaries, kings often negotiated their soldiers’ services to their own benefit, both receiving a settlement, monetary or territorial. Taifa kingdoms were unstable as the subjects did not have religious loyalty to its leaders, borders were based on military control, creating a situation in which Christian mercenaries were needed to protect the territory. With the Christians’ victory over the Almohads at Las Navas, there were less opportunities for Christians to fight in Iberia and many soldiers went to the Maghreb to obtain wealth and power through the sale of their soldiering services. The Christians’ distinct closed-formation fighting techniques were sought after by the Muslims who knew the Christians’ tactics were superior to their own fighting style and would help them defeat rival Muslim kingdoms. The papacy, while first condemning Christian mercenaries who fought for another faith, decided to use the soldier’s presence in North Africa to the benefit of the church and push missionary efforts there rather than cast out the wayward mercenaries. Christian and Muslim connections through warfare were complex, ranging in scope from fighting against each other out of religious duty, to contractual fighting together to quell another enemy. The forging and breaking of these tenuous ties demonstrate a dynamic interfaith relationship based on mercenary soldiers in both Muslim Spain and North Africa.

Bibliography

Barton, Simon. “Traitors to the Faith? Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, c. 1100-1300.” In Medieval Spain: Culture, Conflict and Coexistence, ed. Roger Collins and Anthony Goodman, 23-45. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002.

Gutiérrez, Eva. “Christian participation in Almohad armies and personal guards.”  Journal of  Medieval Iberian Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (2010): 235-50.

Khaldun, Ibn. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Trans. Franz Rosenthal. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Lower, Michael. “The Papacy and Christian Mercenaries of the Thirteenth-Century North Africa.” Speculum, vol. 89, no. 3 (2014): 601-31. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43577030

Reilly, Bernard. The Medieval Spains. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Rodriguez, Jarbel, trans. “Two Views of El Cid.” In Muslim and Christian Contact in the Middle Ages: A Reader, ed. Jarbel Rodriquez, 148-56. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020.

[1] Simon Barton, “Traitors to the Faith? Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, c. 1100-1300,” In Medieval Spain: Culture, Conflict and Coexistence ed. Roger Collins and Anthony Goodman, (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 26.

[2] Jarbel Rodriguez, trans. “Two Views of El Cid,” In Muslim and Christian Contact in the Middle Ages: A Reader, ed. Jarbel Roderiquez (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020), 133.

[3] Rodriguez, “Two Views of El Cid,” 135.

[4] Rodriguez, 135.

[5] Rodriguez, 133.

[6] Rodriguez, “Two Views of El Cid,” 136.

[7] Rodriguez, 133.

[8] Barton, “Traitors to the Faith? Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, c. 1100-1300,” 31.

[9] Barton, 31.

[10] Barton, 31.

[11] Barton, 28.

[12] Barton, “Traitors to the Faith? Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, c. 1100-1300,” 29.

[13] Barton, 35.

[14] Bernard Reilly, The Medieval Spains (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 101.

[15] Reilly, 100.

[16] Ibn Khaldûn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, Trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 224-28.

[17] Michael Lower, “The Papacy and Christian Mercenaries of the Thirteenth-Century North Africa,” Speculum, vol. 89, no. 3 (2014): 601.

[18] Eva Lapiedra Gutiérrez, “Christian participation in Almohad armies and personal guards,” Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (2010): 241.

[19] Lower, 607.

[20] Barton, “Traitors to the Faith? Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, c. 1100-1300,” 33.

[21] Barton, “Traitors to the Faith? Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, c. 1100-1300,” 33.

[22] Lower, “The Papacy and Christian Mercenaries of the Thirteenth-Century North Africa,” 602.

[23] Barton, 25.

[24] Barton, 25.

[25] Lower, 602.

[26] Lower, 603.

[27] Gutiérrez, “Christian participation in Almohad armies and personal guards,” 246.

[28] Gutiérrez, 246.