Before the Umayyad invasion of Iberia in 711, the Visigoths were the people to call the Iberian Peninsula home. As they were both numerous and had a warrior culture, it was a bit of a shock how quickly they fell to the invading Umayyads. Not only did the Umayyads quickly defeat the Visigoths in their homeland, but they did it with a much smaller force than the Visigoths had. How did this happen? The Umayyad victory was due to several factors, including: the bad state of the Visigoths in the eighth century, the differing army compositions, differences in leadership, the Umayyad invasion tactics, and the decisiveness of the Battle of Guadalete.
While the Visigoth rule ended in 711, the preceding years were marked with internal strife, famine, and plague.[1] The Visigoths struggled from crop failures and famines in 698, 701, and 708.[2]  They also had outbreaks of plague in 707 and 709.[3] By the time of the Umayyad invasion of Iberia, the Visigoth population had been recently halved by famine and plague.[4] The huge numbers advantage was not as big of an advantage than previously thought and the Visigoths who were still living were recovering from sickness and malnutrition. The massive decline of human life reduced commerce and made it easier for the Visigoth’s slaves to escape, further stiffening their economic output.[5] The Visigoths were also a highly divided people. The population was made up of mostly Indigenous Hispano-Romans while the ruling class were the Visigoths who made up the minority.[6] The Visigoth nobility held quite a bit of power since they would elect the next king.[7] This led to numerous instances of bloody infighting which weakened the Visigoths.[8] There had been numerous civil wars and revolts prior to the invasion of the Umayyads in 711.[9] This was preceded by the death of King Watiza, who left the Visigoths divided only one year before the invasion of the Umayyads.[10] Although the Visigoths had a much larger kingdom than the Umayyads, many of their people had died due to famine, plague, or civil war before the Umayyad invasion. The Visigoths were significantly weakened before any combat took place.
The Visigoth army numbered between 25 000 and 30 000 men strong, 5000 of which were cavalry.[11] By law, every free and freed man, aged twenty to fifty, had to do military service and the nobility had to bring at least ten percent of their slaves to battle with them.[12] The men who could afford better gear usually were armed with a sword and a lance, if a cavalryman[13], as well as chainmail or lamellar armour with a shield and a metal helmet.[14] Visigoth slaves were fairly well equipped for slaves. They had body armour, a shield, swords, spears, bows, and slings.[15] However, at the time around the Umayyad invasion, military service was starting to be shunned and avoided by the general Visigoth populace.[16] Many preferred the punishments, which included beatings, fines, loss of capitol, and enslavement, to serving in the army.[17] The Visigoths were famed as incredibly proficient horseman, but it relied on having the fickle Visigoth nobility join you.[18] It seems that while the Visigoths were renowned as fearsome warriors, they had many troubles in managing to scrape together an army at the time of the Umayyad invasion.
The Umayyad army was composed mainly of Northwest Africans.[19] The Umayyad army initially had only 7000 to 12 000 men, 2000 of which were cavalry.[20] This was less than half of what the Visigoth army had. The Umayyad made up for their lack of men by specializing in harassing the enemy with projectiles from range before they were able to attack with their superior numbers in melee.[21] The initial invasion force was led by Tariq ibn Ziyad and consisted of an elite core with many light infantrymen.[22] The elite core of his army were known as the mawali who were those who had willingly converted to Islam and then became clients of established Arab tribes.[23] The elite core were armed with swords, spears, javelins, chainmail or lamellar armor, shields, and helmets.[24] Their cavalry used lances and swords and their infantry often used maces to be able to punch through heavily armoured Visigoth nobles.[25] The majority of Tariq’s invasion force were poorly equipped light infantrymen.[26] These men were either only partly converted to Islam or completely pagan and were a variety of nationalities including: Berber, Coptic Egyptian, Greek, and Persian.[27] They were generally armed with two javelins, a shortsword, and a small round leather shield with either little or no armour and no helmet.[28] Many of the poorer of these troops used slings and stones as their primary weapons.[29] Their horsemanship, much like the Visigoth’s, was considered superb without the drawback of needing fickle nobles to decide to fight.[30] Tariq’s superior Musa ibn Nusayr upon hearing of Tariq’s successful first invasion, raised an army of 18 000 to help from North Africa.[31] Better yet, this army was equipped similarly to the mawali or elite core of Tariq’s army, not the poor light infantry.[32]
Despite having less troops than the Visigoths, the Umayyad army beat them handily. Factors that contributed to this were the unwillingness of Visigoths to do military service and of the nobles to be expert cavalrymen, the sickness and famine that took many possible soldiers away from the Visigoths, and, as we will soon see, the leadership of both parties.
The Visigoth leadership was poor in many ways. As mentioned before, the nobility had much infighting between themselves and the kings. When King Watiza died, his three sons were not old enough to rule so General Roderic ruled in their stead.[33] Many were eventually against him. The sons of Watiza were said to have allied with Tariq to make sure that he died in battle.[34] They did this instead of helping Roderic defend their homeland from the invaders. They withdrew from the Battle of Guadalete to ensure his death.[35] Another noble, Julian, asked Tariq to attack Roderic in revenge for raping his daughter.[36] It seems as though many of Roderic’s nobility eventually betrayed him for personal gain rather than help defend their lands. Many nobles were killed in the Battle of Gaudalete which made it difficult for the Visigoths to find a banner under which to unite.[37] The only person who tried to do this was King Agila II who continued to resist.[38] His son Ardo also took up the fight in 714 but by 720 or 721 the Visigoths were fully defeated.[39] This was probably since they apparently made no attempts to negotiate with the Umayyads and instead tried to continue pure Visigoth rule but failed.[40] Roderic was portrayed as quite a bad leader who seemingly failed due to divine punishment.[41] Roderic’s death depicts him trying to swim across a river to safety but drowning due to him being to weak to support himself and his heavy armour.[42] A warrior king who is too weak to carry his gear is surely unfit to lead and undeserving of the land he lays claim to.
The Umayyad Leadership, in contrast, was much more effective. The Umayyad Caliph was able to direct the invasion from Damascus while commanding obedience, devotion, and power from his troops all while still showing more care for his troops.[43] After Roderic’s defeat at the hands of Tariq, Roderic’s family simply surrenders when he arrives at Toledo instead of putting up much resistance.[44] They respect him enough to know when they were beaten.
Some big factors in the Umayyad expansion were overpopulation, lack of food and resources, and limited opportunities in the lands that they had.[45] Hispania was a desirable place to settle due to its ability to support a large population.[46] The Muslim conquest of Africa was complete by 710 and the Visigoths were in a weakened state, the time to strike was now.[47] In July 710, a Berber commander named Mallik ibn Tarif landed near Tarifa with 300 infantry and 100 cavalry to obtain information about Roderic’s forces and morale and to find a good landing area.[48] This scouting party was super important to the success of the Umayyad campaign. It revealed what was explained at the beginning of this paper: the Visigoth’s struggle with famine and plague, the smaller than advertised army, and the political infighting of the nobles. When Tariq’s invasion force arrived, he used the scouting party’s information to move his army quickly through the use of old Roman roads, roads that had been used to help the Visigoths conquer Iberia.[49] The swiftness of the army often allowed them to scare smaller settlements into immediately surrendering without any bloodshed.[50] This preserved Tariq’s small army and allowed him to gain ground for free and to save his men for sieging Visigoth cities which had much more bloodshed.[51] Tariq’s swiftness also allowed him to quickly convert the city of Toledo into a base from which future attacks would be launched.[52] These tactics allow for a much easier taking of Iberia from the Visigoths.
There is an old story about Tariq sending Mughith to Cordoba to find weaknesses in the city.[53] Then a shepherd comes to tell Mughith that a section of wall is weaker than the rest and this information allows an easy siege for Tariq.[54] There are many older stories such as these where someone out of the blue will ask Tariq or another Umayyad if they need knowledge to help them win and will eagerly betray their own people. These stories are meant to create meaning and are embellished to symbolize Islamic piety.[55] It is easy to tell which of these stories are made up and which are real. In made up stories, character names are made up, such as Mughith, due to an Islamic tradition of providing names for the sake of it.[56] Real stories of betrayal, such as Watiza’s sons and Julian, use real names and can be tracked in history to have done what they did. It is important to realize which sources are being used in an essay like this.
The Battle of Gaudalete was the turning point in the Umayyad invasion of Iberia. The Umayyad army crossed the strait from Centra.[57] They were able to do so unopposed due to Roderic being in Pamplona fighting the Basques, but he left as quickly as he could after hearing the news of the invaders.[58] Many Visigoth troops were also guarding possessions in southern Gaul at the time of the battle.[59] The Visigoths opened the battle with a cavalry charge which had to halt due to a hail of javelins and arrows from the smaller Umayyad force, who immediately counter-attacked with their light infantry.[60] Tariq feigned a retreat in the centre of his lines to bait a Visigoth cavalry charge.[61] It was at this point that the Witizan son’s forces withdrew from the battle.[62] The remaining Visigoth cavalry became encircled and was cut down and the Visigoth lines began to break.[63] The Visigoths were routed and were massacred by the Umayyads as they fled.[64] As mentioned before, it was at this battle that Roderic was killed and most of the Visigoth nobility destroyed. It was too difficult for the Visigoths to recover from this, especially with a large second Umayyad army approaching. After this battle, many Visigoths and Jewish mercenaries started to join the Umayyads, probably due to the futility of the Visigoth position.[65] The victory of the Battle of Gaudalete marked the end for the Visigoths, even if they kept on resisting for a few years afterwards.
The thing that truly cemented a Umayyad victory was the building of many fortifications at this time. The Umayyads built many fortifications as well as fortified the cities that had gained during their conquest shortly after obtaining the territory.[66] They were very quick at this because they often reused Roman foundations and masonry in their fortifications and for their signal towers.[67] The array of watchtowers and the difficulty of sieging the newly fortified cities made it impossible for the Visigoths to retake any ground and led to their utter destruction.
The Visigoths had it rough during the Umayyad invasion. They were stricken with plague, famine, civil wars, and lacked the soldiers necessary to defend their home. The Umayyads had a loyal soldier base that moved quickly and often did not need to fight to gain ground. Their early scouting and loyalty allowed them to get where they needed to be and act in a unified way against a fractured and divided enemy. It was no wonder that the Visigoths lost to the Umayyads.
[1] Rose Walker, and John Batten. “The Eighth and Ninth Centuries: Re-emergence and Invention.” In Art in Spain and Portugal from the Romans to the Early Middle Ages: Routes and Myths, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, (2016): 139.
[2] Kai Grundmann. “Rising from the Ashes of Defeat: The Fracture, Downfall, and Remnants of the Visigothic Kingdom.” Medieval Warfare 1, no. 3 (2011): 17.
[3] Grundmann, 17.
[4] Sara Gottardi. “VISIGOTHIC DIVISION AND MUSLIM PRESERVERS OF ORDER.” HispanĂłfila, no. 178 (2016): 226.
[5] Grundmann, 17.
[6] Rose Walker and John Batten. “The Visigothic Period: Fragmentation and Accretion.” In Art in Spain and Portugal from the Romans to the Early Middle Ages: Routes and Myths, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press (2016): 106.
[7] Grundmann, 17.
[8] Grundmann, 17.
[9] Gottardi, 223.
[10] Grundmann, 18.
[11] Alberto Raul, “The Muslim Invasion of Spain: The Battle of Guadalete.” Medieval Warfare 1, no. 3 (2011): 13.
[12] Grundmann, 17-18.
[13] Grundman, 20.
[14] Raul, 14.
[15] Grundmann, 20.
[16] Grundmann, 18.
[17] Grundmann, 18.
[18] Grundmann, 18.
[19] Ramzi Rouighi. “The Berbers of the Arabs.” Studia Islamica 106, no. 1 (2011): 55.
[20] Raul, 13.
[21] Raul, 14.
[22] Erich B. Anderson. “Rise of the Berber Mercenaries: Desert Nomads Come to Europe.” Medieval Warfare 5, no. 4 (2015): 33.
[23] Anderson, 33.
[24] Anderson, 33.
[25] Anderson, 34.
[26] Anderson, 33.
[27] Anderson, 33.
[28] Anderson, 33.
[29] Anderson, 33.
[30] Anderson, 33.
[31] Anderson, 33.
[32] Anderson, 33.
[33] Ibn al-Qutiyya, “C. Ibn Al-Qutiyya, History of the Conquest of Al-Andalus.” In Medieval Iberia: Readings from Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Sources, 41.
[34] Â Â Ibn al-Qutiyya, 41.
[35] Gottardi, 224.
[36] Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam, “B. Ibn ‘Abd Al-Hakam, Narrative of the Conquest of Al-Andalus.” In Medieval Iberia: Readings from Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Sources, 37.
[37] Grundmann, 20.
[38] Grundmann, 20.
[39] Grundmann, 20.
[40] Grundmann, 20.
[41] Gottardi, 224.
[42] Gottardi, 229.
[43] Gottardi, 224-225.
[44] Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam, 38.
[45] Gottardi, 222.
[46] Gottardi, 226.
[47] Grundmann, 19.
[48] Raul, 13.
[49] Walker, 139.
[50] Walker, 140.
[51] Walker, 140.
[52] Walker, 140.
[53] Nicola Clarke. “Medieval Arabic Accounts of the Conquest of Cordoba: Creating a Narrative for a Provincial Capital.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 74, no. 1 (2011): 41.
[54] Clarke, 42.
[55] Clarke, 45, 54.
[56] Clarke, 43, 47.
[57] Raul, 15.
[58] Raul, 15.
[59] Grundmann, 18.
[60] Raul, 15.
[61] Raul, 16.
[62] Raul, 16.
[63] Raul, 16.
[64] Raul, 16.
[65] Anderson, 34.
[66] Walker, 152.
[67] Walker, 153.
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